Rebalancing NATO = Rethinking Defence?

August 2024

Introduction

According to assessments by experts and intelligence agencies, Russia is projected to require a period of six to ten years in order to fully restore its military capabilities to a level that would enable it to launch an offensive against NATO.[1] In such a scenario, given the territorial conditions and current NATO force posture, Allied forces could very well be forced to initially operate in the defence before being able to mass sufficient combat power in theatre, seize the initiative, and conduct an overwhelming counteroffensive – but  is NATO ready for that?[2] 

Carl von Clausewitz, in On War, claims several times that the “defense is a stronger form of fighting than the attack.”[3] Put simply, Clausewitz argues that it is “easier to hold ground than to take it.”[4] This paper argues that the Russian war in Ukraine demonstrates that Clausewitz's dictum holds true today and prepared defensive operations offer considerable advantages over an attacker. It further argues that with NATO’s current doctrine and force posture, which are fundamentally oriented towards offensive operations and do not reflect the demands posed by defensive operations in conventional, high-intensity, peer-to-peer warfighting on the eastern flank, the Alliance will not be able to fulfil its core task reiterated at the 2022 Madrid summit – to credibly deter aggression through a robust force posture.[5] 

First, the successes of Ukrainian defensive operations and, in contrast, the challenges posed by reinforced Russian positions in summer 2023 are briefly analysed. From this assessment, the advantages of defensive operations in contemporary combat are drawn. Then, it is analysed if NATO doctrine and force posture are fit for the requirements of defensive operations. Finally, recommendations for adjustments to Allied doctrine, training, and exercises are developed, which aim to improve NATO's readiness to plan, conduct, and sustain robust defensive operations.

Defensive Operations in Ukraine 

The Russian war against Ukraine has demonstrated the immense challenges for both sides in conducting combined arms offensive operations against a prepared defence. Following, the Ukrainian defence against the Russian invasion in early 2022 as well as the Russian defence against the Ukrainian counteroffensive in 2023 are analysed and their implications for the way we think about defensive operations are assessed. 

Firing Out: Ukrainian Defence in 2022 

The response of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) to the Russian invasion was characterised by long-term preparation, constant adaptation, and steadfast determination. Faced with the looming threat of Russia's long-range precision-strike arsenal, Ukraine concealed and dispersed aircraft, air-defence systems, and ammunition stockpiles on short notice,[6] and implemented elaborate deception measures to lure Russian fires.[7] Although Russia had a significant manpower advantage in most engagements,[8] Ukraine, after being surprised by the large-scale push to Kyiv, was capable of rapidly forming a new group of forces in its capital within the opening week of the invasion by joining special forces, mobilised reserve units, and cadets of military academies into new battalions.[9] 

Analysts attribute the successful defence of Kyiv, a pivotal moment in the early stages of the conflict, mostly to massed fires from two artillery brigades.[10] Ukraine’s large artillery force allowed for sustained, large-scale barrages on advancing columns. On the southern front, where Ukrainian artillery was scarce, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (AFRF) advanced more rapidly.[11] Constant pressure on Russian columns was further sustained by mobile teams with anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) that ambushed advancing formations.[12] Another important factor in the Ukrainian defence was the extensive use of man-portable air-defence systems (MANPADS), which substantially attrited Russian helicopters.[13] The widespread deployment of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) also proved to be highly valuable for reconnaissance and target acquisition.[14] 

Despite the intense fighting and the disadvantage in manpower, the Ukrainian forces were prepared, adapted quickly, managed to rapidly scale up forces, and used massed fire power, mobility, and new technologies to their advantage. 

Digging In: Russian Defence in 2023 

The Russian defensive lines have, so far, proven robust and were capable of slowing down and imposing considerable costs on the Ukrainian counteroffensive starting in June 2023. The slow pace, sometimes even halt, of Ukrainian offensive operations has largely been attributed to the difficulties of breaching the well-prepared, entrenched Russian lines without air support.[15] Moreover, analysts have reported that the AFRF fight more competently in the defence as in the offence.[16] 

The preparation of a layered defence combined with an increased Russian battlefield performance have led to high equipment losses and casualties on the Ukrainian side after various unsuccessful shots at rapid breakthrough.[17] Russia’s combat engineering efforts have produced formidable defensive lines with dense, overlapping minefields, concrete-reinforced strong points, bunkers, and trenches, and entrenched units with UAS for observation, loitering munitions, and ATGMs, supported by heavy artillery and attack helicopters in standoff range.[18] 

In summary, the AFRF have demonstrated higher combat performance and determination in the defence than in the offence and have built formidable layered defensive lines to slow down the Ukrainian counteroffensive. 

Lessons from Defensive Operations in Ukraine 

More than 20 months of fighting in Ukraine have shown that prepared, layered defences with a high density of forces supported by mobile reserves make offensive manoeuvre and decisive breakthrough very hard and costly, even when the attacking force has an immense manpower advantage, fields significant armour, and possesses precision-strike capabilities.[19] Only when defences were “shallow, poorly prepared, or inadequately supported by reserves,”[20] combined arms offensives were able to advance quickly and achieve significant territorial gains.[21] Through preparation, adaptation, massed firepower, new technologies, complex field fortification, and “the physical and moral ability to endure and replace losses of men and equipment,”[22] both UAF and AFRF were able to use the defence to their advantage. Although the accuracy and lethality of modern weapons systems, combined with the widespread proliferation of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, make fixed positions vulnerable, the scarcity and costs of precision-guided weapons have prevented both sides from using them to decisively dismantle their opponent’s defence. 

In summary, the war in Ukraine has shown that defence can still play a crucial role in warfare today and is an effective way to inflict heavy losses in blood and treasure on the adversary, bind enemy forces, gain time for the restoration or concentration of combat power, deny military and political objectives to the adversary, and compensate for numerical disadvantages.[23] This observation is aptly backed by Gady & Kofman, who argue that “[l]and warfare still favours the defender and, between adversaries of comparable strength, breaking out of attrition and overcoming the defensive advantage is still far from easy.”[24] 

How We Fight: NATO & Defensive Operations 

To assess if NATO is prepared for potential conflict scenarios in Eastern Europe that feature defensive operations, this section first examines the role of defensive operations in NATO doctrine. Then, NATO’s force posture in Eastern Europe is matched with the requirements of high-intensity defensive warfighting. 

The Offensive Paradigm in NATO Doctrine 

The increase in effectiveness and precision of weaponry, coupled with the emergence of combined arms manoeuvre tactics, have led many military theorists to view field fortification and defensive operations as largely obsolete today.[25] Instead, Western contemporary military thought favours counterattack over entrenchment, using mobile combat teams, combined air and ground efforts, and rapid shifts of forces to exploit weaknesses in an adversary’s lines of thrust.[26] Today, an offensive paradigm prevails in Western military thought, aptly described in a manoeuvre warfare manual: 

Offensive Action (…) is the only means by which a decision is gained. When successful, the offensive brings victory, while the defence can only avoid defeat. The only effective way to wage war is to act on the offensive for the purpose of delivering a main blow in the decisive direction.[27] 

Following, five NATO capstone, keystone, and tactical publications are analysed to assess how this offensive paradigm is reflected in doctrine today.[28] 

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Allied Joint Publication-01: Allied Joint Doctrine
AJP-01 merely specifies that defensive activities “can be enabling for offensive activities.”[29]  The document establishes the manoeuvrist approach as a key tenet of NATO doctrine and “offensive spirit” as a principle for all operations.[30]  It sets out factors connected to offensive operations as key requirements for effective fighting: pre-emption, surprise, and tempo.[31]
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Allied Joint Publication-03: Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations

AJP-03 only states that offensive action is more decisive than defensive action, therefore the latter should be adopted only “when circumstances and prudence demand.”[32]

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Allied Joint Publication-3.2: Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations

AJP-3.2 states that, while both offensive and defensive activities are used for land tactical operations, defensive measures “should only be seen as part of the means to the end [of offensive action].”[33]

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Allied Tactical Publication-3.2.1: Allied Land Tactics

AJP-3.2.1 dedicates a whole chapter to tactical defensive activities. Although the document shows an even balance between offensive and defensive tactical activities in terms of overall page numbers, defensive activities are considered only for the transition to offensive operations.[34] It also lists “offensive action” as one of the key principles for defensive operations. When conducting defensive operations, units should maintain the “offensive spirit,” “must not remain passive,” and instead attack enemy forces with speed, aggression, and manoeuvre.[35] The guidelines further require commanders to take “every opportunity” to seize the initiative and “incorporate aggressive offensive action to pre-empt, dislocate or disrupt the enemy.”[36] 

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Allied Tactical Publication-3.12.1: Allied Tactical Doctrine for Military Engineering

ATP-3.12.1 provides a subchapter on barriers as an essential element of defensive operations and a two-page section on other defensive activities.[37] When defensive activities are defined, the document deems them not decisive and specifies their purpose as “to provide the right conditions for offensive action.“[38]
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Examining NATO doctrine through its key publications on land operations reveals that the Alliance's operational and tactical concepts consider defensive operations only in a supporting role, if at all. Of the analysed publications, only the tactical ones dedicate a section to defensive operations, while operational doctrine does not provide any conceptual base at all. Even the sections dedicated to the defence refer to offensive manoeuvre as the preferred way of fighting, regarding defensive measures only as a means for direct transition to the offence. 

Military doctrine encompasses the principles that govern the operational conduct of military forces, serving as the foundational tenets and unifying framework for understanding and executing armed conflict.[39] Doctrine thereby provides the conceptual component that, combined with the moral and physical elements of military power, determines how armed forces think, train, and fight. This analysis has shown that the conceptual component of NATO’s fighting power exhibits a serious gap: institutionalised thinking about defensive operations. 

NATO’s Force Posture on the Eastern Flank 

Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022, NATO created four additional battlegroups, committed to deploying more combat-ready forces to Eastern Europe (from 40,000 to 300,000), and agreed on the establishment of a Allied Reaction Force for rapid reinforcement.[40] It is questionable, if these efforts under the umbrella of the New NATO Force Model suffice to credibly project the capability to withstand Russian aggression in Eastern Europe.
 

Allied forces have never conducted operations against a capable, peer-to-peer adversary with the size, advanced technology, and air defence network of the AFRF.[41] During the war in Ukraine, Russia has shown that most of its systems are lethal and effective, and it will continue to resolve identified weaknesses during and after the war.[42] This will further reduce NATO’s technological edge and could lead to conflict scenarios involving “enormous costs in blood, metal and treasure.”[43] For example, medical planners have estimated a casualty rate for high-intensity war in Eastern Europe of 3,600 per day for the U.S. army alone.[44] Neither the force size on the eastern flank, especially in the Baltics, nor the overall strength of armed forces, reserves, and training capabilities could currently sustain such loss rates.[45] This poses the risk of front lines collapsing “once available manpower is no longer available to defend them or reinforcing units cannot deploy in time.”[46] 

Consumption and loss rates rates of ammunition, materiel, and systems would also be extraordinarily high.[47] Without sufficient forward-positioned stockpiles, a defending force would, for example, not be able to sustain the firepower necessary to deliver the blunting effect on advancing columns described above.[48] Currently, neither stockpiles nor production capacity of NATO members reflect these demands.[49] Moreover, due to their design, size, and capabilities, the battlegroups in Eastern Europe may encounter significant challenges in the face of Russian aggression. While strategically forward-positioned, they lack the sheer numerical strength[50] and capabilities[51] required to hold ground against a large-scale incursion. 

In summary, NATO's efforts to enhance deterrence and defence in Eastern Europe since 2022 are steps in the right direction, but do not suffice to credibly and visibly create the capabilities needed to withstand armed aggression beyond the opening phase. 

The Way Ahead: Walk and Chew Gum 

The lessons from Ukraine highlighted in this analysis have shown that, even amidst the proliferation of ISR capabilities and precision-guided weapons, defensive operations and field fortification still play a crucial role in warfare today. A role, for which NATO doctrine and force posture is ill-prepared. Armed forces in NATO lack the conceptual underpinning for conducting effective defensive operations. This dearth of knowledge, and a lack of engagement and dialogue among thinkers and practitioners, could leave militaries unprepared for potential conflict scenarios in Eastern Europe – how we think is how we train, and that is how we fight. Moreover, neither the forward deployed forces in Eastern Europe, nor the overall force size of European NATO members, stockpiles, and production capacity reflect the demands of high-intensity warfighting, defensive or offensive, in which an adversary seeks to overwhelm the defending forces before sufficient reinforcements equalise combat power. 

To credibly deter aggression in Eastern Europe, NATO must be capable to fight effectively in the offence and defence. This capability must be visibly reflected in NATO doctrine and force posture. It is essential to note that the purpose of this analysis is not to depart from an offensive mindset, but rather to encourage the cultivation of simultaneous offensive and defensive thinking and the development of mental and physical defensive capabilities to be well-prepared to persevere in the defence until the culmination point. To this end, the following recommendations are made. 

Recommendations 

1.    Doctrine

1.1  Allied Command Transformation (ACT) should develop and include a subchapter on the fundamentals, purposes, and characteristics of defensive operations in the next AJP-03: Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations. It should further develop and include a subchapter on how to plan, prepare, and execute defensive land operations in the next AJP-3.2: Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations.

1.2  ACT should establish a Defensive Operations Centre of Excellence (DO CoE) in a willing and able Member State to develop and institutionalise defensive thinking through education, training, exercise, and evaluation (ETEE), analysis and lessons learned (ALL), doctrine development and standardisation (DDS), and concept development and experimentation (CDE). Inviting Ukraine as an institutional partner would significantly increase the level of expertise and experience in the DO CoE.

2.    Training & Exercises

2.1  The Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) should develop, conduct, and advise on programs and joint force exercises on brigade-level in which a defending force is pitted against an attack with a 1:3 force ratio and must exploit the defensive advantage to prevail.

2.2  JWC, if applicable in cooperation with DO CoE, should encourage Member States to increase the share of defensive tactical activities in training and develop and provide guidelines on lessons learned from Ukraine to Member States, especially on engagement area development (e.g., establishment of reinforced individual and vehicle fighting positions, construction of tactical and protective obstacles, shaping of terrain, (remote-)minelaying).

Footnotes

[1] See Mölling & Schütz (2023, p. 4).
[2] See Johnson (2022) and Morgan (2018).
[3] von Clausewitz (1976, pp. 84, 358, 380).
[4] von Clausewitz (1976, pp. 357f.); see Smith (2023).
[5] NATO (2022, p. 6); Johnson (2022).
[6] Zabrodskyi et al. (2022, p. 23).
[7] For example by deploying dummy air-defence systems, see Zabrodskyi et al. (2022, pp. 25-26, 38).
[8] Zabrodsky et al. (2022, p. 28).
[9] Zabrodskyi et al. (2022, p. 28).
[10] Zabrodsky et al. (2022, p. 2).
[11] Zabrodskyi et al. (2022, p. 34).
[12] Zabrodskyi et al. (2022, p. 33).
[13] Zabrodskyi et al. (2022, p. 29).
[14] Zabrodskyi et al. (2022, p. 37).
[15] Konaev & Daniels (2023); Kofman & Lee (2023).
[16] Watling & Reynolds (2023b, p. 24).
[17] Watling & Reynolds (2023b, p. 1).
[18] Kofman & Lee (2023, pp. 9, 14); Watling & Reynolds (2023a, p. 9).
[19] Gady & Kofman (2023, p. 8); Biddle (2023).
[20] Biddle (2023).
[21] Biddle (2023); see, for example, the Ukrainian counteroffensive in Kharkiv, where “some Russian units were only at 20 percent strength and lacked a cohesive defensive posture” (Kofman & Lee 2023).
[22] Betz (2023).
[23] See also NATO Standardization Agency (2009, p. 6-1).
[24] Gady & Kofman (2023, p. 16).
[25] Betz (2023).
[26] Boyd (2018, pp. 9, 124f., 168ff., 190, 193).
[27] Defence Services Staff College Wellington (1998, p. 5).
[28] ATP-3.2.1.1 (Conduct of Land Tactical Activities) and ATP-3.2.1.2 (Conduct of Land Tactical Operations in Urban Environments) are restricted and could not be used for analysis. The NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept, AJP-3.12 (Military Engineering), and AJP-05 (Planning of Operations) do not mention defensive operations. AJP-3.3 (Air and Space Operations) touches upon defensive ground operations only as one task of close air support.[29] NATO Standardization Office (2022a, p. 164).
[30] NATO Standardization Office (2022a, pp. 4, 120).
[31] NATO Standardization Office (2022a, p. 134f.).
[32] NATO Standardization Office (2019, p. 1-17).
[33] NATO Standardization Office (2022b, pp. 14, 38).
[34] NATO Standardization Agency (2009, p. 6-1).
[35] NATO Standardization Agency (2009, pp. 6-1).
[36] NATO Standardization Agency (2009, pp. 6-1 to 6-2).
[37] NATO Standardization Office (2016, pp. 4-7 to 4-9, 5-14 to 5-16).
[38] NATO Standardization Office (2016, p. 5-14).
[39] British Army (2011, pp. 1-1 to 1-3).
[40] NATO (2023).
[41] Miller & Hall (2023); Kofman & Lee (2023, p. 29).
[42] Watling & Reynolds (2023a, pp. 24, 29); Zabrodskyi et al. (2022, p. 53).
[43] Joshi (2023, p. 12).
[44] Crombe & Nagl (2023, pp. 22, 25).
[45] Zabrodskyi et al. (2022, p. 56).
[46] Kofman & Lee (2023).
[47] Zabrodskyi et al. (2022, p. 64); Gady & Kofman (2023, p. 16).
[48] Zabrodskyi et al. (2022, p. 55).
[49] Barrett (2023); Joshi (2023, p. 3); Zabrodskyi et al. (2022, pp. 2, 56); Watling & Reynolds (2023b, p. 20).
[50] 2,500 km of front line from Estonia to Bulgaria would be covered by >100,000 in up to 10 days (Tier 1), around 200,000 in 10-30 days (Tier 2), and 500,000 in 30-180 days (Tier 3).
[51] For example, military engineering, sufficient artillery support, widespread distribution of ATGMs and small UAS, as well as prepared and hardened defensive positions.

Literature 

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Biddle, S. (2023). Back in the Trenches – Why New Technology Hasn’t Revolutionized Warfare in Ukraine. Foreign Affairs, September/October 2023. 

Boyd, J. R. (2018). A Discourse on Winning and Losing. Air University Press. 

Defence Services Staff College Wellington (1998). Manoeuvre Warfare. Defence Services Staff College Wellington. https://indianstrategicknowledgeonline.com/web/Manoeuvre%20Warfare.pdf. 

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Kofman, M., & Lee, R. (2023). Perseverance and Adaptation: Ukraine’s Counteroffensive at Three Months. War on the Rocks, 4 September 2023. https://warontherocks.com/2023/09/perseverance-and-adaptation-ukraines-counteroffensive-at-three-months/. 

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NATO Standardization Office (2016). Allied Tactical Publication-3.12.1: Allied Tactical Doctrine for Military Engineering. https://moodle.unob.cz/pluginfile.php/98162/mod_resource/content/1/ATP-3.12.1%20Allied%20Tactical%20Doctrine%20For%20MILENG%202016%20STUDY%20VERSION.pdf. 

NATO Standardization Office (2019). Allied Joint Publication-03: Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1187030/AJP_3_Conduct_of_Ops_UK_elements_C1.pdf. 

NATO Standardization Office (2022a). Allied Joint Publication-01: Allied Joint Doctrine. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1148298/AJP_01_EdF_with_UK_elements.pdf.pdf. 

NATO Standardization Office (2022b). Allied Joint Publication-3.2: Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1085158/20220207-AJP3-2_EDB_Land_Ops.pdf. 

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Zabrodskyi, M., Watling, J., Danylyuk, O. V., & Reynolds, N. (2022). Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February – July 2022. RUSI Special Report, 30 November 2022. https://static.rusi.org/359-SR-Ukraine-Preliminary-Lessons-Feb-July-2022-web-final.pdf. 

Picture credit: 
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